The final two chapters (chapters 6 and 7) evaluate lottery voting against certain normative requirements commonly employed as axioms in the literature on social choice. Firstly, I evaluate it against the necessary and sufficient conditions of simple majority rule identified by May: decisiveness, anonymity, neutrality, and positive responsiveness. This comparison is complicated, since May assumes a deterministic rather than probabilistic procedure, but I argue that lottery voting meets analogues of his conditions that share the same intuitive appeal: it always produces a decision, it treats all voters and options equally, and voting for an option always favours it (which, I note, removes any incentives for strategic voting). I then proceed to compare lottery voting to Arrow's axiomatic conditions: collective rationality, universal domain, Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship. Again, there are some difficulties because democracy is here understood as a pure procedure for settling conflicts of individual interests, rather than as a system for computing a single collective will or interests. Nonetheless, I observe that lottery voting will always respect unanimous preferences; while a random dictatorship is normatively unproblematic (there is no individual who always gets his or her way, regardless of others' preferences).
Chapter 7 is devoted to rationality, and argues that no decision procedure is inherently rational or irrational: what matters is the rationality of individual agents adopting it, which is a condition of my contractualist approach. Just as it may be rational for two individuals to settle a disagreement by tossing a coin, so it may be rational for a larger group to settle disagreements by agreeing to accept a randomly-drawn vote.
If democracy is understood as citizen sovereignty and political equality, then the possibility of lottery voting shows that it does not logically require majority rule. Whether the members of society should prefer lottery voting to majority rule or vice versa seems to rest on the conditions that they face (e.g., whether there are permanent minorities), but the mere possibility of an alternative discredits some arguments for majority rule and shows that we need to justify that procedure separately from democracy. Moreover, lottery voting has a number of benefits, aside from giving minorities some chance of victory, because it removes incentives for strategic voting and makes it easy to use weighted voting (if desired). 
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